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Abstract 
This study explores how paradoxical tensions between economic growth and environmental 
protection are avoided through organizational mythmaking. By examining the European oil 
and gas supermajors’ ‘CEO-speak’ about climate change, we show how mythmaking 
facilitates the disregarding, diverting, and/or displacing of sustainability tensions. In doing so, 
our findings further illustrate how certain defensive responses are employed: (i) regression, or 
retreating to the comforts of past familiarities, (ii) fantasy, or escaping the harsh reality that 
fossil fuels and climate change are indeed irreconcilable, and (iii) projecting, or shifting blame 
to external actors for failing to address climate change. By highlighting the discursive effects 
of enacting these responses, we illustrate how the European oil and gas supermajors self-
determine their inability to substantively address the complexities of climate change. We thus 
argue that defensive responses are not merely a form of mismanagement as the paradox and 
corporate sustainability literature commonly suggests, but a strategic resource that poses 
serious ethical concerns given the imminent danger of issues such as climate change. 
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I know some fear that the environmental issues threaten the whole future of the 
industry, [...] such fear can be paralysing and ultimately will be self-defeating 
because nothing will threaten the future of the industry more than ignoring reality 
John Browne (1998c), former CEO of BP, speech at the 
World Energy Congress, Houston (TX) 
 
Corporate sustainability confronts organizations with interdependent economic, social, and 
environmental concerns (Elkington 1998). Whilst these three dimensions must be considered 
together in order to contribute to sustainable development (Gladwin et al. 1995), firms tend to 
discriminate against social and environmental concerns in favor of financial returns 
(McWilliams and Siegel 2000). Seeking to overcome this dilemma, scholars increasingly draw 
from paradox theory that considers organizations inherently conflictual sites and emphasizes 
that tensions, if properly harnessed, “can be powerful to enable peak performance” (Smith and 
Lewis 2011, p. 395). Applied to corporate sustainability, scholars argue that instead of ignoring 
tensions between economic, social, and environmental dimensions, firms should accept and 
embrace often contradictory demands simultaneously (Berger et al. 2007; Gao and Bansal 
2013; Hahn et al. 2014, 2017). By foregoing temptation to ignore sustainability tensions, 
managers can confront complexity directly, thereby potentially transcending the otherwise 
stifling trichotomy of economic, social, and environmental dimensions (Hahn et al. 2015). This 
is commonly referred to as a “paradox approach” or “integrative view” on corporate 
sustainability (for overview see Van der Byl and Slawinski 2015). 
This literature demonstrates the efficacy of a paradox perspective in confronting sustainability 
tensions, often highlighting its productive outcomes. However, it largely overlooks defensive 
responses through which firms aim to avoid sustainability tensions (Iivonen 2017), and the 
ethical implications therein. This oversight persists despite earlier studies explicitly cautioning 
against defensive reactions given potentially detrimental consequences for organizational 
survival (Leonard-Barton 1992; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003; Vince and Broussine 1996). 
Accordingly, as Schad et al. (2016, p. 39) note in their review of the past 25 years of paradox 
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literature, there have been several calls to investigate “[how] defense mechanisms can cause 
good intentions to result in undesired outcomes.” We heed these calls by exploring the ‘defense 
mechanisms’ or defensive responses that firms employ to avoid sustainability tensions, 
particularly focusing on responses toward climate change. In doing so, we analyzed ‘CEO-
speak’ (Amernic and Craig 2006) of the European supermajors – BP, Shell and Totali. These 
companies—and the words of their CEOs—are critical in the global debate on climate change,  
shaping much of the business-climate change discourse (Levy 2005). CEO-speak refers to 
instances in which CEOs communicate publically on behalf of their organization, for instance 
through corporate reports, in the media, during speeches at industry conferences, universities, 
and so forth. Situating our study within a critical-interpretivist discourse analysis tradition 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Mumby, 1987), we are interested in how the European 
supermajors’ CEO-speak obfuscates tensions between climate change and their core business 
of producing and selling fossil fuels (see also Putnam et al. 2016, p. 109). To conceptualize 
this process, we draw from the concept of organizational mythmaking – a symbolic act that 
simplifies complexity and legitimates the views of the mythmaker (Boje et al. 1982; Brown, 
1994; Filby and Willmott, 1988; Wright and Nyberg, 2014b).  
Our findings illustrate how the construction of three myths—the techno-fix, Promethean oil 
man, and climate partnerships—facilitate defensive responses that act to either entrench well-
established understandings and practices that are themselves environmentally harmful, or 
transfer tension from the source of the problem (i.e., the production of fossil fuels) to external 
actors such as the government or civil society organizations. We demonstrate how, by avoiding 
sustainability tensions through organizational mythmaking the European supermajors become 
increasingly embedded into a self-referential myopia that limits their potential to imagine an 
alternative energy future that is likely discordant with the myths they themselves construct. 
This has significant ethical implications: defensive responses not only help the supermajors 
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evade responsibility to address climate change but also marginalize alternative discourses, 
including those groups who identify with these discourses. 
Our study contributes to literature on paradox and corporate sustainability by illustrating how 
sustainability tensions are actively avoided through symbolic action (i.e., mythmaking). Rather 
than expose the “bizarre” contradiction between fossil-fuel based growth and climate change 
mitigation (Wright and Nyberg 2015a, p. 28), we show how this contradiction is repressed. The 
implications of this repression are potentially devastating for the natural environment, not to 
mention corporate performance, hence our title: ‘Drilling their own graves’. 
Organizational paradox and corporate sustainability 
Responses to tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes regarding sustainability are generally 
conceptualized in three ways: acceptance, confrontation, and avoidance. Firstly, in terms of 
acceptance, actors acknowledge paradoxes as unsolvable puzzles that are part of everyday 
existence (Poole and van de Ven 1989; Smith and Lewis 2011). Without opposition toward 
tensions per se, managers improvise when confronted, thereby avoiding the difficulties and 
risks of attempting a controlled resolution. The paradox is left open; Pandora’s box remains 
shut (Beech et al. 2004). With corporate sustainability, acceptance strategies may be effective 
on an individual level (Ivory and Brooks 2017). However, on an organizational level, 
acceptance strategies are arguably less effective given that organizations could face, inter alia, 
legitimacy threats from stakeholders with contending views. These stakeholders may enforce 
a “moral minimum” (e.g., Idemudia 2008, p. 94), insisting organizations fulfill certain 
affirmative duties such as providing a safe work environment. Such moral considerations 
become further pronounced within the public sphere in the case of large, multinational firms 
operating in developing countries, which “are simultaneously challenged by a multitude of […] 
issues and environmental demands are characterized by high dynamism, complexity, and 
heterogeneity” (Scherer et al. 2013, p. 275).  
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The second conceptualization involves firms proactively confronting sustainability tensions 
(Lewis 2000; Vince and Broussine 1996). As indicated by Poole and Van de Ven (1989), this 
can be achieved either by separating or synthesizing tensions. On the one hand, in terms of the 
former, tensions are rendered manageable by compartmentalizing conflicting poles (Smith and 
Lewis 2011). At extremes, entire organizations split to better manage tensions. E.ON, one of 
Germany’s ‘Big 4’ energy providers, for example severed its fossil fuel and renewables 
businesses, forming two separate entities (Timperley, 2016). On the other hand, when 
proactively responding to paradox by synthesis, tensions are forged into a new form, 
understood as complex interdependencies rather than contradictions (Jarzabkowski et al. 
2013). For instance, in their study of the Alberta oil sands, Slawinski and Bansal (2015) 
highlight how some firms, instead of polarizing short- and long-term perspectives, creatively 
juxtaposed them to better manage temporal tensions related to climate change. This is 
indicative of ‘paradox thinking’ – a cognitive frame that fosters accommodation of conflicting 
yet interrelated sustainability dimensions (Hahn et al. 2015; Kannothra et al. 2017). Paradox 
thinking is akin to Gao and Bansal’s (2013, p. 247) ‘integrative’ approach to managing social 
and environmental issues, which applies an ethical orientation “achieved by fulfilling 
conflicting responsibilities, in one’s best capacity, with compassion and sympathy.”  
A third conceptualization widely undertheorized in the sustainability literature concerns a 
defensive strategy whereby paradox is avoided (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 1987). Here, 
scholars draw from Freudian psychoanalytic theory to demonstrate how individuals respond 
defensively in tension-laden and anxiety-provoking situations (Dey et al. 2016). A defensive 
response or mechanism refers to “any policy or action that prevents someone (or some system) 
from experiencing embarrassment or threat, and simultaneously prevents anyone from 
correcting the causes of the embarrassment or threat” (Argyris 1993, p. 40). Typical examples 
include, amongst others, shifting blame toward a scapegoat or repressing unpleasant emotions 
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and thoughts (Vince and Broussine 1996). This is counterproductive given that, in the long 
term, avoidance intensifies complexity, creates vicious cycles, and produces negative feedback 
loops (Smith and Lewis 2011). Avoiding tensions also has serious ethical ramifications as is 
evidenced by corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Tyco in which managers developed 
pathological obsessiveness with commercial objectives at the expense of moral concerns (Hall 
et al. 2007). Indeed, as Treviño and Brown (2004, p. 74) suggest, this type of behavior led to 
the downfall of professional services firm Arthur Andersen: “[the] leadership’s earlier 
commitment to ethics came to be drowned out by the firm’s increasing laser-like focus on 
revenues.” However, when a firm’s core business is under threat, it may be left with little choice 
but to employ a defensive response – irrespective of ethical ramifications. For instance,  as 
illustrated by Iivonen’s (2017) study of Coca-Cola’s engagement with  the issue of obesity, the 
beverage company engaged in projection as a defense mechanism in order to justify its business 
model.  
On the whole, the studies discussed tend to focus on productive aspects of embracing 
sustainability tensions (the first and second conceptualizations) over unproductive defensive 
responses, as the third conceptualization highlights. How these defensive responses facilitate 
avoidance of sustainability tensions must be further explored, particularly given that 
sustainability issues such as climate change pose high levels of complexity, threatening to 
overburden firms (Levy and Lichtenstein 2011). Many firms find it difficult, if not impossible, 
to embrace sustainability tensions because their core product inevitability results in tradeoffs 
between economic and environmental concerns (Hahn et al. 2010). This is clearly the case with 
the fossil fuel industry, whereby surrendering to a zero-sum game between fossil fuels and 
climate change would be deemed by some stakeholders as ‘throwing in the towel.’ Therefore, 
shunning or manipulating sustainability tensions is arguably likely; it is well evidenced that 
firms sometimes expend substantial resources to influencing stakeholder perceptions through 
 7 
impression management strategies to appear engaged with sustainability issues (Hooghiemstra 
2000; van Halderen et al. 2016). However, an impression management lens does not suffice to 
explore paradox avoidance given that it mostly concerns the deliberate manipulation of 
stakeholder perceptions, which contrasts with the type of reactive defensive responses 
provoked by sustainability tensions (Hahn et al. 2014). These responses may not only prompt 
serious legitimacy issues (Wright and Nyberg 2015b), but could also incite unethical behavior 
as, by avoiding sustainability tensions, employees often fail to act on sound moral judgement, 
or worse, as top management teams develop ‘ethical blindness’ (De Klerk 2017; Palazzo et al. 
2012; Treviño and Brown 2004). Therefore, a lens that specifically addresses the types of 
defensive responses that are triggered to avoid complexity, including the effects of employing 
such responses, is necessary. To conceptualize this process, we draw from the concept of 
organizational mythmaking, which incorporates aspects of all the three responses discussed 
above.   
Organizational mythmaking  
The use of myth in organization studies has a longstanding pedigree (Boje et al. 1982; Brown 
1994; Filby and Willmott 1988; Ganzin et al. 2014), playing a particularly significant role in 
understanding climate change (Farmer and Cook 2013, p. 445; Hulme 2009, p. 340). Whilst 
the concept of mythmaking has been employed in several ways, we draw largely from Barthes’ 
(1972) seminal Mythologies in which he conceptualizes myths as fulfilling a dual function, 
both acting as a mechanism that produces shared meaning and as a means to legitimate existing 
power structures (see also Filby and Willmott 1988). Applied to the context of organizations, 
myths manifest in the symbols—e.g., logos, rituals, slogans, brands, stories—that, as Putnam 
(1983, p. 40) argues, are “not simply reflections of organizational meanings; they are ongoing 
processes that constitute organizational life.” Mythmaking thus constructs meaning structures 
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necessary to foster shared understandings within and between organizations and their external 
stakeholders (Boje et al. 1982).  
Mythmaking is most salient in times of complexity when organizations face problems without 
easily identifiable solutions (Boje 1991). As Barthes explains (1972, p. 143), “[myth] abolishes 
the complexity of human acts, it gives them a simplicity of essences, it does away with all 
dialectics, […] it organizes a world without contradictions because it is without depth.” When 
reasoning fails to establish a sense of order, myth becomes a symbolic device that 
misrepresents situations as somehow unambiguous, thereby “constructing a rationalizing 
façade” (Brown 1994, p. 871). Generally, the less that is known about a social context and the 
higher the perceived threat, the more extreme the myth given the need to rationalize higher 
levels of complexity (Bottici and Challand 2006). Sustainability poses high levels of 
complexity given that it often confronts organizations with sets of multiple conflicting, 
contradictory tensions that must be dealt with simultaneously (Devinney 2009; Hahn et al. 
2014). 
Myths may in some instances be reactive, used to create simplified mental maps that assuage 
anxiety stemming from confronting the unknown. Organizations sometimes engage in this type 
of mythmaking about climate change and sustainability. This is evidenced by technologies such 
as carbon capture and storage or geoengineering being touted as a climate change panaceas, 
despite (currently) being economically unviable, technologically impractical and, as with 
geoengineering, morally dubious. Nyberg and Wright (2014, p. 205) in particular have drawn 
from this perspective to illustrate how myths perpetuate a capitalist imaginary of ‘rationality’ 
and ‘efficiency’, which they argue “absorb and adapt the critique of corporate capitalism while 
enabling ever more imaginative ways of exploiting nature.” 
Along with reducing complexity, several studies address the legitimation function of myth. For 
instance, mythmaking functions to legitimate certain organizational specialisms, such as public 
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relations (Filby and Willmott 1988) or management consulting (Clegg et al. 2004). Brown 
(1994) draws from this notion of myth as legitimating tool to illustrate how members of an 
organization gained acceptance for a new product launch that benefitted the interests only of 
an elite group within the organization. Indeed, legitimation through the production of myth is 
intrinsically linked to power as mythmaking often serves to conceal the political interests of 
powerholders: “myths not only create, sustain, and legitimate historical, current and future 
action, but also shape and conceal political interest and permit organizational actors to 
rationalize difficult and complex phenomena” (Brown 1994, p. 863).  
Indeed, myth is traditionally framed as a mechanism that obscures, used to explore, amongst 
other social phenomena, class struggles (Cassirer 1973). As myths represent certain narratives 
as ‘truth’, they exclude the political interests of those deemed less significant or those at odds 
with dominant myths. This highlights a more oppressive function of mythmaking, raising 
concerns regarding the moral obligation of the mythmaker as myths are used in the pursuit of 
legitimating a social order that favors those groups in power (David 2001; Gehmann 2015). 
This function of mythmaking concerns the way myths, when enacted, have certain discursive 
effects (Brown 2005; Clegg 1989). On the one hand, mythmaking may become self-fulfilling 
as myth-makers begins to act according to their own narratives. As Brown (2003, p. 108) 
suggests: “[myth] encourages feelings of omnipotence and fantasies of control among 
significant stakeholder groups.” On the other hand, the myth-consumer becomes embedded 
within a predetermined identity that aligns with the interests of the myth-maker (Bottici and 
Challand 2006). This highlights how myths tend to reproduce, in codified forms, relations of 
domination (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Clegg 2013).  
Overall, mythmaking and the way organizations respond to sustainability issues correspond: 
sustainability issues provokes complex situations that lack readily deployable solutions while 
myths provide a ‘veil’ that rationalizes and reduces complexity. Indeed, focusing on 
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organizational mythmaking demonstrates both the agency of firms as somewhat ‘aware’ of the 
often irreconcilable tension between sustainability dimensions and core business objectives, 
and that the relationship between dimensions may be obfuscated. Therefore, mythmaking 
offers a fruitful lens through which to conceptualize defensive responses to sustainability 
tensions, and may also shed light on a ‘darker side’ of avoiding sustainability tensions, 
including ethical implications which remain currently underexplored in the literature on 
sustainability and paradox. We therefore pose the following questions: how does mythmaking 
facilitate defense mechanisms that avoid sustainability tensions? How does mythmaking 
determine corporate responses to sustainability issues such as climate change?       
Context 
This study is set in an ‘extreme context’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007): the controversial 
relationship between multinational oil and gas companies and climate change (Du and Vieira 
2012). The oil and gas industry is uniquely controversial, compared to other contested 
industries – such as the fur, tobacco, or gambling industries – given our dependence on fossil 
fuels (Bhattacharyya 2009). Oil and gas companies are critical actors in the global debate on 
climate change and have played an important role in shaping much of the business-climate 
change discourse (Levy 2005). These firms hold a vast resource base, particularly in terms of 
technology and financial power that, depending on their allocation, could greatly benefit the 
fight against climate change (Levy and Kolk 2002; Stevens 2016). Furthermore, besides their 
own production processes—i.e., the energy needed to extract, refine, and transport oil and 
gas—these firms’ core product is fossil fuels, which makes up a substantial proportion of total 
greenhouse gas emissions (IEA 2016a). As such, taking into account environmental disasters 
such as spills, oil and gas companies are often scrutinized by a wide variety of publics and 
given the “classical role as the villains of climate change” (Lovell 2010, p. xii). This has 
conversely led to increasing efforts, especially by environmental groups and ethical investors, 
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to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry (Durand and Vergne 2015; Ferns and Gunther 2017). As 
Ansar et al (2013, p. 65) argue: “the outcome of this stigmatization process [...] poses a far-
reaching threat to fossil fuel companies and the vast energy value chain. Any direct impacts 
pale in comparison.”  
Given pressure from publics and other stakeholders such as civil society organizations and 
investors (MSCI 2014; Paun et al. 2015), alongside increased regulatory changes (Peeters and 
Uylenburg 2014, p. 181), oil and gas companies have responded to climate change through a 
process that has varied over time and differs amongst individual companies (van Halderen et 
al. 2016). We chose to analyze BP, Shell and Total, or the companies referred to as European 
supermajorsi, given that they have publically engaged with climate change for a longer period 
of time than US supermajors, largely quiet climate change until very recently (Goldenberg, 
2015; Pulver, 2007). 
Data and analytic strategy 
Our dataset comprises the European supermajors’ CEO-speak (Amernic and Craig 2006, 
2007), which refers to a CEO’s public speeches, letters to stakeholders in sustainability reports, 
and media interviews/contributions (see Appendix 1). As illustrated in Table 1, while a variety 
of audiences are addressed through CEO-speak, most of our corpus concerns CEO speeches at 
oil and gas industry conferences and CEO letters in sustainability reports. Hence, our data set 
both ‘looks in’ as CEOs speak to their own industry about climate change, and ‘looks out’ by 
addressing wider stakeholder groups. 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
This type of data is commonly utilized to analyze corporate disclosures about sustainability 
related issues (Beelitz and Merkl-Davies 2011; Mäkelä and Laine 2011; Tengblad and Ohlsson 
2009; van Halderen et al. 2016). CEOs are often seen as “the social face of the organization” 
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and, particularly in the case of fossil-fuel companies, engage publically in justifying their 
firms’ actions in light of climate change (Brennan and Conroy 2013, p. 176). A CEO’s words 
are important and carry a certain clout; CEO-speak can be considered as texts “which leave 
meaningful traces” (Phillips et al. 2004, p. 640). As argued by Mäkelä and Laine (2011, p. 
219), CEO-speak not only “reflect[s] organizational culture and values but also [has] broader 
cultural and political significance [as CEOs] participate in the processes through which 
societies come to frame and understand phenomena, such as environmental challenges, 
sustainable development and corporate responsibility.”  
Indeed, the words of top management are considered emblematic of the entire organization as 
opposed to representing the CEO’s personal beliefs (David 2001). While CEO-speak may to a 
certain degree be ‘doctored’ by public relations professionals (see Amernic and Craig 2013, p. 
381), this is less important than the fact that stakeholders perceive the CEO’s words as 
reflective of the organization’s stance on social and environmental issues (Craig and Amernic 
2004). Hence, although CEO-speak may not represent the views of all members of an 
organization per se, especially if that organization is large, CEO-speak remains a useful 
representation of an organizational culture (Palmer et al. 2004). Similar to how CEO-speak 
‘talks into being’ an organization’s culture (Brown 1994), so does CEO-speak construct the 
myths that constitute an organizational culture. Indeed, as Boje et al (1982, p. 18) suggest: 
“myths [...] represent one way in which other elements of organizational culture are 
conceptually organized into a system of organizationally relevant logic.” 
Our dataset concerns texts from 1997-2015. We selected 1997 as a starting point given that this 
was the first time an oil and gas supermajor—BP in this case—publically acknowledged the 
need to address climate change (Lovell 2010). We concluded our dataset at the end of 2015 
given that the Paris Agreement was signed – a monumental moment that signaled a potential 
shift in the fossil-fuel-climate change debate (Vidal and Vaughan 2015). After 2015, fossil-
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fuel companies have been much less explicit about climate-change strategy, which largely 
revolves around waiting for governments to implement the Paris Agreement (Kinley 2016). 
Texts were primarily selected by downloading sustainability reports and CEO speeches from 
the respective corporate websites and using Factiva and Google newspaper searches for media 
interviews and newspaper contributions. Online searches also directed us to speeches that were 
not listed on each company’s corporate website, but were available on third-party sites or 
represented as extracts in media articles. Documents that were not available on corporate 
websites but publically available at some point in time such as previous sustainability reports 
were requested by sending email requests to the communications departments of each 
company. In total, we collected 228 texts (see Appendix 1).  
We adopt a critical-interpretative approach to the study of mythmaking (Bowles 1989; Boyce 
1996; Mumby 1987). Our understanding of myth is largely inspired by interpretivist work on 
organizational symbolism (Brown 1994; Dandridge et al. 1980; Pondy et al. 1983), which 
aligns with the constructivist underpinnings of most paradox research (Jarzabkowski and Lê 
2015; Smith and Lewis 2011). Furthermore, we consider mythmaking and the defensive 
responses constituted therein as having certain discursive effects (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). 
This is particularly useful for our study given that a critical-interpretative approach emphasizes 
the formative role of myth in shaping the very context it seeks to represent (Boje et al. 2004; 
Fairhurst and Putnam 2004). In other words, the way that supermajors talk about climate 
change creates a (mis)representation of reality that, when performed, determines their response 
to climate change.  
Our data analysis process followed three phases. The first involved a thematic analysis adapted 
from previous work on narrative and myth in organizational studies (Ganzin et al. 2014; Hardy 
and Maguire 2010; Humphreys and Brown 2007). Accordingly, we used qualitative data 
analysis software (NVivo) and engaged in an open coding strategy to identify particular 
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narrative structures—e.g., plot, the protagonist or hero, journey, end goal or destination, 
enabling/disabling forces, events, and coherent identities (Boje 2001)—that the supermajors 
used to address their relationship with climate change (Strauss and Corbin, 2007). This process 
resulted in an array of first-order codes reorganized based on overlaps with other similar codes 
(e.g., efficiency, innovation, technology) and then grouped them into second-order themes (i.e., 
the techno-fix, Promethean oil man and climate partnerships). At this point we noticed that 
each myth contained distinctive contradictions seemingly re-casted by the supermajors as 
somehow strategically beneficial. This led us to the second phase of analysis in which we 
focused specifically on utterances that responded to contradictory elements. During this stage, 
we began to oscillate between the literature on paradox defenses and the data. Through an 
abductive approach, we abstracted from the data to identify and categorize the most salient 
defensive responses within each myth. Finally, during the third phase of analysis, we were 
concerned with the extent to which the supermajors’ limited engagement regarding climate 
change was determined by the effects of mythmaking. Here, we were interested in how, by 
enacting organizational myths about climate change, the supermajors reproduce their dominant 
power position within the global climate governance regime (Levy and Newell 2005). We thus 
identified discourses furthered through the supermajors’ mythmaking that propagate status quo 
practices of extracting, producing, and marketing fossil fuels.  
Findings 
In this section, we demonstrate how three myths constructed by the supermajors—techno-fix, 
Promethean oil man, and climate partnerships—facilitate the avoidance of sustainability 
tensions through certain defense mechanisms (see Table 2). First, we discuss each myth 
individually, highlighting the form of each myth and how its associated defense mechanism 
acts to disregard, divert, or displace sustainability tensions. Second, we demonstrate two 
discursive effects of mythmaking—marginalization of alternative discourses and evading 
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responsibility for addressing climate change—to illustrate how the supermajors’ responses to 
climate change are shaped. 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
The techno-fix myth 
The supermajors place significant emphasis on the virtues of science, human ingenuity and 
technology as the means to address climate change and “reach for the prize of clean, green 
fossil fuels” (van der Veer 2005a). Through the techno-fix myth—the most dominant myth in 
our dataset as illustrated in Figure 1ii—an anthropogenic notion of ‘managing’ the natural 
environment is propagated, with CEO speak often referring to the merits of engineering 
expertise: “[…] technology can do that for us, and we need to be in a position of demonstrating 
that there are answers to this tradeoff which make it possible for people to have a good lifestyle 
without damaging the environment” (Browne in Minnesota Public Radio 2002). Certain 
technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) or liquefied natural gas (LNG) are 
framed as all-encompassing climate change solutions. In this regard, as evidenced in Total’s 
2014 CEO letter, the European supermajors often suggest that LNG “is set to become the 
world’s transitional fossil fuel” (Pouyanné 2014a). Such a grand and generalized statement that 
oversimplifies an otherwise complex reality acts to provide the ‘silver bullet’ for the 
supermajors to ‘deal’ with climate change. This cause-and-effect rationality is a cornerstone of 
the techno-fix myth as Voser’s (2012a) speech title exemplifies: “The natural gas revolution: 
a secure, abundant force for good.” 
The techno-fix myth represents nature as something to be valued in economic terms – i.e., 
putting nature on a balance sheet and accounting for the negative impacts of the oil and gas 
extraction, refinement and transportation process. As such, much of the CEO-speak regarding 
this myth is managerial, expressed through rational rhetorical appeals (logos). As Total’s CEO, 
de Margerie, asserts in an interview with the Telegraph: “In 100 years, there should be more 
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renewables. Is it good? If we can make progress. One of the concerns is a cost. Today we all 
know the most economical fuel is oil” (Mason 2010). Accordingly, climate change is not 
portrayed as a uniquely distinct consideration that impedes the overall strategy of the 
organization. Instead, controlling for the effects of climate change becomes a concern that can 
be effectively managed within the parameters of standard business practices such as, inter alia, 
cost-benefit analysis.  
As highlighted in Figure 1, the techno-fix myth is most discernable when CEOs address 
students at universities. A good example of this is Tony Hayward’s (2010a) speech to London 
Business School in which the then BP CEO explained: “[the] first conclusion is that, in all 
circumstances, energy efficiency is the No.1 priority. That means more efficient vehicles, 
buildings and electronic appliances – more investment in technology and infrastructure such 
as smart grids.” There is no denial of climate change or apologetic tone: climate change is faced 
head on and techno-fix solutions are swiftly offered. BP’s environmental concerns are made to 
fit with business-as-usual through language of managerialism and risk, and not vice versa. This 
reduces the threat posed by climate change by dismissing the need to radically overall 
economic systems or firm practices (e.g., Klein 2014). 
Defense mechanism 1 – Regression: Underpinning the techno-fix myth is the unwillingness of 
the supermajors to depart from long-established practices, despite professing the need to 
change those practices in order to adapt to climate change in the future. Therefore, the techno-
fix myth facilitates regression whereby historical accounts are used to legitimate present action 
and future intent. For example, Shell’s Peter Voser in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center 
in 2009 entitled ‘The Energy Company of the Future’ stated: “[we’ve] learned from experience 
– sometimes the hard way – that it takes time to develop and build a market for new types of 
energy. That’s why a more efficient use of energy is crucial.” By reemphasizing certain past 
realities as ‘truths’—in this case regarding the virtues of markets and technology—‘solving’ 
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climate change becomes reliant on habits that, somewhat paradoxically, caused climate change 
in the first place. Moreover, historical figures are often invoked to demonstrate that challenges 
these figures faced were inevitably overcome, implying that the same will occur with climate 
change. That is, CEOs frequently use “historical theorizations of change” in a rhetorical sense 
“to counteract radical change and to promote evolutionary or path-dependent change” 
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2005, p. 52). For example, Shell’s Moody-Stuart (2000) recollects 
challenges of the railway age: “gas developments have much in common with the beginning 
of the railway age in Britain as engineers like Robert Stephenson and Isambard Kingdom 
Brunel struggled to carry the railway tracks over waterways.” Similarly, BP’s Bob Dudley 
(Dudley 2013a) likens the climate change crisis to earlier energy challenges that were 
overcome: “The world’s major source of oil in the 1850s was the whale. But as many species 
were hunted to near-extinction, Colonel Edwin Drake decided to look for a new source. His 
success in drilling a well in Titusville, Pennsylvania gave birth to the modern energy industry.” 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
Promethean oil man myth 
The supermajors consider themselves noble upholders of modern civilization, providing “the 
energy for the basic things of life, such as heat, light and mobility” (Hayward 2007a). This is 
reminiscent of the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus, a Titan who not only helped humans 
stand upright but also famously provided them with fire stolen from the gods (Dryzek 1997). 
The crux of this myth is demonstrated by Dudley’s (2013b) speech at Deendayal Petroleum 
University, India, in which he asserted that access to BP’s energy “represents millions of people 
moving out of poverty, into homes and jobs, enjoying heat, light and mobility to improve their 
lives. Here in India, I know, access to energy really transforms lives.” The ‘transformational’ 
role of energy, and the industry’s role as providing the impetus to lift people out of poverty 
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rationalizes the supermajors’ position. Indeed, as de Margerie (2012) emphasized in Total’s 
CSR Report: “Without access to energy, there is no development.”  
A central theme in the construction of this myth is the risks that supermajors’ undertake to 
access ‘energy’, confronting and ‘controlling’ nature (Lovelock 2010) in the process much like 
Prometheus confronting the gods. This is often highlighted by the common narrative of 
successfully drilling in ultra-deep water. In a speech at the Arab Strategy Forum in Dubai, 
Shell’s van der Veer (2006a) explained: “[...] the industry has a good record of meeting these 
kind of environmental challenges. We only have to look back thirty years ago to when the 
conditions in the North Sea were seen by many as too hostile for successful development.” Van 
der Veer anchors deep into the past to demonstrate how Shell has successfully confronted and 
resolved difficult challenges, in this case regarding a hostile nature able to be ‘overcome’.  
In the construction of this myth, the supermajors often draw on ideographs (McGee 1980), or 
‘god terms’ that appeal to a common good and are generally considered appropriate by a wide 
set of audiences – e.g., rights, development, progress, growth, and prosperity. A particularly 
important ideograph is ‘energy’, a frequently used synecdoche, or a figure of speech, 
representing ‘oil and gas’. In this vein, BP’s Browne (2004a), at a speech at the Princeton 
Environmental Institute remarked:   
Can we transcend what appears to be a harsh and unacceptable tradeoff 
between the goal of improving living standards – and on the other hand the 
equally imperative goal of protecting the natural environment which 
sustains human life? Energy is at the heart of that tradeoff. 
The emptiness in the term ‘energy’ in this case symbolically transcends the tradeoff between 
living standards and environmental protection. In other words, as Browne (2004a) notes, 
unavoidable tradeoffs are displaced by the principal task of securing ‘energy’. What exactly 
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‘energy’ constitutes is somewhat irrelevant; what is important is only that it is secured. Another 
commonly used ideograph is ‘responsibility’, often employed in reference to a higher purpose, 
as illustrated in Thierry Desmarest’s (2002) CEO letter: “Corporate spirit and a sense of 
responsibility are closely linked.” Interestingly, the promethean oil man myth is especially 
prevalent in the CEO’s letter in sustainability reports (see Figure 1), which may allude to the 
particularly emotional rhetorical appeal (pathos) in sustainability reports as compared to 
traditional annual reports (e.g., Castelló and Lozano 2011).  
Defense mechanism 2 – Fantasy: A fantasy of omnipotence, immortality and prestige is the 
defense mechanism driving the Promethean oil man myth. Through this fantasy, the 
supermajors imagine themselves as the answer to climate change, arguing that despite being 
its cause, they are concurrently the most likely solution, possessing “financial muscle and 
technical expertise to help take their ideas from the lab to demonstration level and then to 
commercial scale” (Voser 2010a). The grandiosity of such claims helps escape the harsh reality 
that fossil fuels and climate change are indeed irreconcilable, which is evidenced by the 
frequent recalling of exaggerated heroic acts, as Tony Hayward reminiscences: “The oil and 
gas we’re developing in deepwater Gulf of Mexico requires the same kind of technology it 
takes to put someone on the moon” (in Chazan 2009). This reflects a fantasy of omnipotence, 
linking BP with super-human, nostalgic feats such as the moon landing, thereby obscuring the 
reality that their core product and mitigating climate change are, in fact, irreconcilable. 
Through such “moral tales” (Leeuwen and Jacob 2007, p. 105), the supermajors further 
entrench their self-proclaimed role as noble upholder of modern civilization. For instance, in a 
speech at the European Conference of Environmental and Engineering Geophysics Tony 
Hayward (2007a) argued: “[…] when it comes to dealing in a timely and practical manner with 
the great insecurities of the early 21st century, the energy industry is not just part of the 
solution, it is the solution.” 
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A fantasy defense mechanism constructs an ‘other’ framed as the reason for the supermajors’ 
continued carbon-intensive practices: those without ‘fire’ in developing countries, so to speak. 
As de Margerie (2007, p. 2) described: 
Global energy demand is going to remain strong, because developing 
countries lag far behind industrialized nations. How can you justify dashing 
the hopes of the billion and a half people in the world who don’t have 
electricity, or crushing the aspirations of people who want to own a car in 
China or India, where there’s only one car per 50 or 100 inhabitants, 
compared with one for every two people in the West? 
This implicitly pits ‘dashing the hopes of the billion and a half people’ against preserving the 
natural environment, making it seem somehow unethical to discredit the industry. The 
Promethean oil man myth thus operates on the fantasy of supermajors as poverty eradicators, 
deflecting attention from the issue at hand: climate change.  
Climate partnerships myth  
When confronted with climate change, the European supermajors frequently posit that such 
environmental issues can only be successfully addressed by partnering with actors not 
traditionally associated with the oil and gas industry – e.g., civil society organizations and 
governments. As these actors possess a pre-established credibility, projecting has the additional 
rhetorical appeal of validating the character (ethos) of the European supermajors through 
association with authority (see Vaara et al. 2006, p. 799). For example, as Total’s Desmarest 
argued: “[...] we are working with the other stakeholders and in partnership with governments, 
which are the only organizations with the authority to set the policy orientations that frame our 
initiatives.” Not only do supermajors acknowledge a need to partner and engage in dialogue, 
they also embrace a need to be held accountable by external stakeholders, or as Voser asserted: 
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“We at Shell […] must not be shy to open up to scrutiny” (Voser 2011a). Of course, this is 
based on voluntary reciprocity: there are no hard laws committing either party to action.  
The industry’s relationship with the state is approached through partnerships, as Voser (2012b) 
during a speech to policy makers at the World Water Forum, explains:  
We need partnerships that marry the commercial expertise of the private 
sector. We need partnerships that remain impartial, and that don’t fall under 
the influence of one interest group. And we need partnerships that make a 
tangible impact on the policymaking process 
Governments are therefore imagined as necessary to the commercial viability of investing in a 
low-carbon future, which usually takes the forms of either providing subsidies for energy 
efficient technology investments, or developing carbon trading platforms such as the EU 
emissions trading system (EU-ETS). In a speech to the Singapore Energy Summit, Voser 
(2011b) asserted: “Government has an important role in setting the rules, in spurring 
investment in new technologies that may not see a payoff for many years. Rather than choose 
winners and losers, government should set the end goals, then provide appropriate incentives 
that let the market determine the most effective solutions.” This shifts the onus of responsibility 
from the supermajors to governments; after all, as Shell’s van der Veer commented in a 
Guardian interview, “Governments need business to help [...] but it is not Shell who can solve 
the CO2 problem in the world” (in Macalister 2007).  
Defense mechanism 3 – Projecting. By underscoring the role of external organizations as 
necessary to addressing climate change, the climate partnerships myth employs a projective 
defense mechanism. Here, responsibility to address climate change is relocated from the source 
of the problem—i.e., fossil fuels extracted from the ground—to external sources. Thereby, 
tensions stemming from a zero-sum game between fossil fuels and climate change are placed 
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onto the transnational climate policy community, NGOs, national governments, and 
consumers. Interestingly, despite shifting responsibility to external sources, the supermajors do 
not completely discredit the ideal of free markets. As Hayward (2007a) of BP described: 
“History firmly suggests that all these problems are susceptible to action and innovation. This 
process can be aided or hindered by the way in which governments perform their role of policy 
making and the enactment of law.” As such, ‘action and innovation’ is ‘aided or hindered’ to 
the extent that they are efficiently regulated by governments. Based on this logic, if climate 
change is not adequately addressed, it is not the fault of the supermajors’ actions or lack thereof, 
but because they were not properly regulated by an external (responsible) party.  
The production of tar sands, often considered particularly carbon intensive (Crooks 2015), 
vividly illustrates this defense mechanism. As van der Veer (2006b) explained in an interview: 
“Governments specify their energy mix through royalties, taxation levels and permitting 
requirements. […] Once the government decides, our responsibility is to be one of the lowest 
CO2 operators for this source of energy.” Because responsibility is not internal – i.e., the 
supermajors will not self-regulate their production of tar sands – ecological concern is relocated 
from tar sands producers to “governments, NGOs, and other critical stakeholders” (Voser 
2011c).  
Discursive effects of avoiding tension through mythmaking 
As illustrated above, the above myths construct defensive responses that avoid the 
contradiction between being a fossil fuel company and engaging in climate change mitigation. 
There are two particularly noteworthy effects: (i) marginalizing alternative discourses through 
regression and entrenchment in the past; and (ii) evading responsibility for addressing climate 
change by transferring tension away from the source of the problem. We show that through 
these effects, the supermajors foreclose the possibility of substantive action to mitigate climate 
change.  
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First, by entrenching tensions deeper into past understandings the supermajors reinforce certain 
‘truths’ that, over time, marginalize discourses that do not conform to these ‘truths’. This 
exemplified most noticeably in the techno-fix and Promethean oil man myths. For example, 
regarding the techno-fix myth, the supermajors exhibit a near obsession with measurability in 
which addressing climate change can only be achieved with increased efficiency, better 
performance, and risk-benefit evaluation. Browne (1997) in his famous speech at Stanford 
remarked: “[…] we need a better understanding of how our own emissions of carbon can be 
monitored and controlled, using a variety of measures including sequestration. It is a very 
simple business lesson that what gets measured gets managed.” Any investment that could 
address climate change must be proven under this rubric. As such, significant investment in 
renewables, for example, becomes particularly difficult because there are too many 
‘unknowns’ that cannot be necessarily be calculated, proven, or measured (Levy and 
Lichtenstein 2011). Even if initiatives do conform to this ‘ideology of numbers’ (Chelli and 
Gendron 2012), such as pricing carbon through financial markets, they tend to reproduce the 
obsession with measurability, since carbon markets are themselves predicated on discourses of 
measurability (Böhm et al. 2012). Therefore, the supermajors become trapped by their fixation 
with measurability, which, in turn excludes alternative discourses that cannot be easily 
quantified such as deep-ecology or systems thinking (Devall 1991; Williams et al. 2017). 
This narrow identification with the past reproduces an over-reliance on organizational practices 
that are not suitable for addressing large-scale environmental issues. Furthermore, using 
preexisting accounting tools and calculation metrics to account for the risks of climate change 
reinforces the objectification, and ultimately reification, of nature (Mäkelä and Laine 2011). 
Because the supermajors are entrenched into past habits of measurability, the natural 
environment is consequently stripped of its intrinsic properties and presented as an object to be 
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valued, as de van der Veer (2009a) nonchalantly notes in his key note speech at the 10th 
International Oil Summit in Paris: “Mother Nature put it there, and we take it out.” 
Notwithstanding measurability, as detailed in the discussion of the defense mechanism of 
regression in relation to the techno-fix myth, analogies that emphasize notable historical figures 
are frequently employed to legitimate modern-day practices. While these accounts produce a 
strong nostalgic association with industry’s heroes from past, they likewise reproduce a 
hegemonic masculinity that is pervasive in the oil and gas industry (e.g., Miller 2004). Winston 
Churchill is frequently used by BP in this manner: 
That's the challenge. So what are we doing? First, we're investing in the next 
generation of oil and gas resources around the world. Winston Churchill 
once said that security in oil came from a diversity of supply. That was right 
in 1915—when, incidentally, he was a shareholder in BP on behalf of the 
government, some 50 percent—and it is right right now (Browne 2005a) 
In this instance, during a speech at the Brookings Institution, BP’s John Browne refers to the 
climate “challenge” as similar to a situation that Churchill, at the time serving as First Lord of 
the British Admiralty, faced when he proposed that the British naval fleet switch from domestic 
coal to BP’s oil. This draws attention not to innovative practices that could combat climate 
change, but to past successes and similar challenges faced by patriarchal, historical figures. 
The second discursive effect of mythmaking concerns how the supermajors shun responsibility 
for addressing climate change by transferring tension away from the source of the problem—
i.e., the extraction and production of fossil fuels. This occurs most saliently with the 
Promethean oil man myth and with the climate partnership myth. In terms of the former, rather 
than focus on the realities of climate change, the supermajors assert a need to “take care” of 
people from “resource-rich countries” who “need food, housing and all the other basic products 
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and services” (Browne in Mahony 2004). This neocolonial sentiment misrepresents developing 
countries as necessarily impoverished and somehow inferior without basic services such as 
electricity, lost without the help of the supermajors. Therefore, the supermajors scapegoat those 
at “the bottom of the energy ladder” (van der Veer 2007a) for continued demand for fossil 
fuels. As Voser (2011d) asks: “Hundreds of millions more will emerge from energy poverty in 
the coming years, buying their first fridge, computer or car. What will all this mean for overall 
energy use?” From a psychoanalytic perspective, this is common with projection defenses – 
blame is usually transferred from those who dominate, toward their weaker subordinates 
(Oliver et al. 2008).  
A similar picture unfolds with the climate partnership myth as responsibility for solving climate 
change is transferred to external parties. There is, after all, little need to pursue alternative 
energy sources or invest substantially in carbon-reduction technologies when responsibility to 
solve climate change becomes that of the state or energy consumers. This disregard for 
considering alternatives is further enforced through the patronizing tone that permeates much 
of the CEO-speak, particularly during the typically unscripted Q&A portion of speeches. CEOs 
often insist that challengers “face the facts” and be “realistic.” As de Margerie argues: “It will 
be ages before carbon-neutral energy sources overtake fossil fuels […]. Admitting that doesn’t 
mean we’re somehow irresponsible; rather, it means we’re facing the facts and using them to 
develop actionable, real-world solutions” (de Margerie 2008a). Our interpretation of such 
statements is that de Margerie considers himself, and presumably his European supermajor 
counterparts, as somehow more knowledgeable about climate change compared to those who 
challenge the industry, framed as somehow “unrealistic.” Conversely, de Margerie’s bravado 
may be considered a mask that represses his own insecurities regarding the complexities of 
climate change vis-à-vis the fossil fuel industry.  
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In sum, it is evident that left with little choice, the supermajors have engaged extensively in 
organizational mythmaking. This is facilitated by defensive responses that obfuscate much of 
tension stemming from complexities associated with climate change. In terms of the discursive 
effects of enacting these myths, the conclusion we draw is that it seems increasingly unlikely 
that the supermajors would fully engage in large-scale climate change mitigation.  
Discussion 
The motivation for this study arose from the generally productive tone of corporate 
sustainability studies that use a paradox lens to argue that sustainability dimensions should be 
embraced, even if they seem contradictory (Gao and Bansal 2013; Hahn et al. 2014, 2015). 
Most of this literature seemed to overlook that a “paradox approach” would be difficult to 
implement in industries where tradeoffs between economic and environmental concerns are 
unavoidable (Wright and Nyberg 2015a). This led us to base our study on fossil fuel companies, 
asking what these companies do upon being confronted with what ex-BP CEO Lord Browne 
refers to as an “existential threat” to the oil and gas industry: climate change (Clark 2014). In 
this respect, we demonstrate how the European supermajors have, over time, reconstituted 
climate change as something they embrace. Indeed, it is more difficult to discredit those 
organizations that seem to embrace that for which they are being discredited. Below we discuss 
some of our study’s main contributions to the literature on tensions and corporate sustainability, 
and reflect on the ethical implications of our findings.  
Whilst most studies on corporate sustainability tensions focus on how embracing tensions can 
have particularly powerful effects if properly harnessed, we detail how avoiding tensions may 
also have powerful – albeit undesirable and unsustainable – effects. Although capitalizing on 
paradox can “[lead] to creative solutions to complex problems such as sustainability” (Van der 
Byl and Slawinski 2015, p. 59), it can also have the reverse effect in terms of reinforcing an 
“instrumental logic” (Gao and Bansal 2013). This occurred in the case of the supermajors as 
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tensions between economic growth and environmental protection were obfuscated through 
mythmaking to appear as if sustainability is at the heart of these companies, without necessarily 
being so at all. As such, we propose that the literature on tensions within corporate 
sustainability seriously consider instances in which the idea of embracing contradictory 
sustainability dimensions is misused or even abused to reproduce the status quo.  
Our findings question the extent to which integrative perspectives on sustainability can and 
should be pursued in cases where tradeoffs between sustainability dimensions are inevitable 
(Margolis and Walsh 2003). Whilst an integrative sustainability perspective certainly appeals 
conceptually and in certain cases also operationally, its allure as a ‘transcendental’ form of 
sustainability can be (mis)appropriated by firms. Few studies in the corporate sustainability 
literature have explicitly addressed such a defensive response to tensions. To our knowledge, 
the only empirical study to do so is Iivonen’s (2017) account of how Coca-Cola engages in a 
projection defense to deflect responsibility for obesity issues. Interestingly, the author calls for 
further research in this area by emphasizing that: “Attention must therefore be paid to such 
situations in further developing the integrative view in the less-than-ideal world in which 
powerful organizations and industries, controversial or not, do not easily cease to exist” 
(Iivonen 2017: forthcoming). We addressed this call in many ways by focusing on the ‘less-
than-ideal world’ of a fossil-fuel economy, building on Iivonen (2017) both by considering 
additional defense mechanisms (i.e., regression and fantasy), and by emphasizing the 
discursive effects of defensive responses.  
Our study does not neglect that there may be many other cases that illustrate the creative, 
productive and synergistic potential of a paradox approach to sustainability (Hahn et al. 2015; 
Jay 2013). However, there is a potential danger in not critically distinguishing between, for 
instance, the way cross-sectoral social partnerships between firms, governments and NGOs 
adopt a paradox approach to harness the tension between competition and collaboration 
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(Stadtler 2017), and how fossil-fuel companies can use paradox instrumentally to distort 
tension between their core product and climate change. Whilst the former might enhance 
‘coopetition’ (Garud et al. 2002), the latter only reproduces practices that pose an imminent 
threat to the well-being of the Earth system (IPCC, 2014). This raises valid concerns regarding, 
for instance, notions of the justice, equity and morality of perpetuating a fossil-fuel energy 
system by distorting complexities of climate change. From a deontological perspective, do the 
supermajors not have a duty to reduce the harm its products are causing to humanity and the 
natural environment? After all, as Desmond Tutu (2014) remarked, the negative impact of 
human activity on the Earth system is both “the human rights challenge of our time [and] a 
deep injustice.” That climate change may result in significant devastation for societies, 
especially those in the Global South (Hallegatte et al. 2011), raises serious concern as to the 
moral integrity and duty of the mythmaker – in this case, fossil fuel companies. Hence, we 
suggest that more research consider how the ‘dark side’ of managing paradox may be covering 
up practices that are in breach of basic ethical principles.  
More generally, this study also contributes to the organization studies literature on tensions, 
contradictions, and paradox (Putnam et al. 2016; Schad et al. 2016). We extend current theory 
by exploring defensive responses as constructed through organizational mythmaking (Boje et 
al. 1982; Brown 1994; Filby and Willmott 1988; Ganzin et al. 2014). Indeed, paradox literature 
suggests that defensive responses, such as those identified in this study, are only effective in 
the short-term as tensions inevitably resurface (Smith and Lewis 2011; Vince and Broussine 
1996). Therefore, organizational paradox scholars might reject our emphasis on how 
mythmaking is used to avoid tensions longer term. However, mythmaking is not a pure 
avoidance strategy. Indeed, as Barthes (1972, p. 143) notes: “Myth does not deny things, on 
the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, 
it gives them a natural and eternal justification.” Whilst the supermajors’ responses were 
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certainly constructed in a defensive manner, they were proactively employed through 
mythmaking as a symbolic act of purification, simplification and justification over time. 
Mythmaking thus involves confronting paradox by actively obfuscating tensions in such a way 
that their anxiety provoking tendencies are rendered impotent.  
As per the famous war adage “the best defense is a good offence,” our findings suggest that 
the best way to avoid tensions may be, in some cases, to actively distort them. This does not 
conform to the traditional divide between defensive and proactive responses as advocated by 
most paradox research (Lewis 2000). Instead, depending on the situation in which the response 
unfolds, coupled with the intent of the actor constructing the response, defensive and proactive 
strategies potentially complement one another. Jarzabkowski and Lê (2015, p. 37) for instance 
hint toward this possibility by exploring the role of humor as a way to construct responses to 
paradox, illustrating how “at the micro-level, all responses are in their own way ‘active’ 
responses.” Similarly, in our study, defensive responses were also actively constructed; 
however, our case differs given that defensive responses continued to repress rather than 
expose tensions, with dangerous consequences for the planet. By avoiding sustainability 
tensions, the supermajors are increasingly entrenched in a single option reality where “the 
future becomes beholden to the past” (Smith and Lewis 2011, p. 291). The fossil fuel industry’s 
refusal to substantively engage with sustainability tensions is considered by some to be 
detrimental to the industry itself (Mckibben 2012), as evidenced by a recent Chatham House 
report – International Oil: Companies The Death of the Old Business Model (Stevens 2016). 
Ultimately, we show that paradox can be actively constructed in such a way that it becomes as 
strategic resource (e.g., Hardy et al. 2000). In this context, there are serious ethical implications 
as tensions between business and the natural environment—and nature itself—are used as 
means to an end, the ‘end’ in this case being shareholder value. In addition, that nature 
possesses any sort of intrinsic worth is rejected. Irrespective of these ethical concerns, that 
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paradoxes are purposefully molded and taken advantage of is not frequently discussed in the 
literature. This process, or what Czarniawska (1997) calls ‘deparadoxification,’ places a 
somewhat different light on paradox since the friction that a paradox perspective cites as the 
trigger for organizational change becomes suppressed and skewed to align with the interest of 
its manipulator (Reay and Hinings 2009; Townley 2002). In many respects, particularly from 
a political economy perspective, climate change is inherently contentious, and should arguably 
remain so (Wittneben et al. 2012). Therefore, corporate discourses on climate change that are 
stripped of contentiousness are arguably less likely to provoke any sort of large-scale change. 
We highlighted how mythmaking was used to mask contradictions and to propagate the status 
quo, therefore fostering inaction on climate change. As Benson argues (1977, p. 8), without 
contradiction there is no “continuing source of tensions, conflicts, and the like which may, 
under some circumstances, shape […] action to change the present order.”  
Our final contribution underscores the use of myth as a means to examine corporate discourses 
on environmental issues (e.g., Wright and Nyberg, 2014). The explicit use of myth in studies 
of organization and management theory has lost its prominence, arguably given that myth is 
already incorporated into contemporary theory as its ‘cultural component’, for example, 
amongst others, considering the way that organizations resemble ‘rationalized myths’ à la 
Meyer and Rowan's (1977) seminal piece on institutional theory. However, myths are 
representative of deeply ingrained socio-political ideas and practices that, through their 
dramaturgy, evoke an emotional response difficult to capture an overt focus on myth as an 
analytically distinctive construct. By using a myth lens we avoid considering communication, 
on the one hand, a mere rhetorical tool (van Halderen et al. 2016), and on the other, as purely 
constitutive (Christensen et al. 2013). Myth instead considers strategic and constitutive forms 
of communication as mutually informative. That is, not only did the supermajors produce 
myths about climate change, but they were also constituted by the myths they themselves 
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created (Brown 2006). As illustrated, this dual function of myth has certain discursive effects 
that not only marginalizes alternative discourses, but also constrains their ability to adapt to 
climate change. 
In all, mythmaking is particularly useful to exploring issues such as climate change as probable 
solutions (e.g., ‘de-growth’ or ecological preservation) often run counter to dominant myths 
that have existed since the enlightenment period; e.g., human ingenuity and our superior 
dominance over all that is non-human (Dryzek 1997). Mythmaking provides organizations with 
a means to construct a narrative that might seem to overcome tensions between economy and 
ecology, whilst actually being ‘empty’: “[myth] is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a 
hemorrhage, or perhaps an evaporation, in short a perceptible absence” (Barthes 1972, p. 142). 
The ‘emptiness’ of the myths produced by the European supermajors is evidenced by 
overwhelming reliance on consequentialist claims that the use of fossil fuels is morally justified 
because of some benefit to the greater good (especially the Promethean oil man myth). 
However, what is considered ‘good’ for society, what is considered harmful, and what group 
in society should benefit, is exclusively defined by BP, Shell and Total’s own teleological 
views. It almost solely benefits the utility of the supermajors, not those of marginalized groups 
in society because, after all, less-advantaged members of society will likely be most burdened 
by climate change (Hallegatte et al. 2011). Thus, it should be earnestly questioned whether the 
utilitarian justification used by the European supermajors—i.e., that fossil fuels produces more 
good for society than harm—remains valid especially as alternative energy becomes 
increasingly viable (Carrington 2017; IEA 2016b).  
Limitations, future research, and conclusion 
Our study has certain limitations. First, our focus on BP, Shell and Total omits other companies 
that due to differences in size, status, and location, might construct other types of myths about 
climate change. However, we selected these companies given their notorious status as the 
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villains of climate change, as evidenced for example by the stigmatization efforts of several 
publics (Ansar et al. 2013; Ferns and Gunther 2017). There are other fossil fuel companies that 
depending, for example, on their location, would construct their defensive responses differently 
within their corporate disclosures. For instance, a study that compares US supermajors—Exxon 
and Chevron—to European supermajors may yield interesting insights (van Halderen et al. 
2016).  
Furthermore, our focus on CEO-speak excluded many voices both internal and external to the 
organization. Due to the unwillingness of many oil-industry representatives to speak about 
climate change as is common in controversial industries (Lindgreen et al. 2012), CEO speak 
was a necessary focus. Ideally, however, for future studies, it would be useful to gain access to 
employees that work “on the front lines,” in order to explore how micro defensive responses 
are constructed to address situational complexities related to environmental concerns (e.g., 
Sharma and Jaiswal 2017). As such, whilst CEO-speak lays a foundation for understanding 
defensive responses on an organizational level, future work should consider the construction 
of paradox on operational levels.  
Lastly, by basing our case on fossil fuel companies we emphasized an extreme case despite 
there being other cases in which tradeoffs may not inevitability occur. As such, our case might 
not be generalizable to other sectors. For example, low resource intensive sectors such as the 
financial services or certain high-tech sectors might not experience the near impossibility to 
adapt to climate change, depending on the extent to which their stakeholders demand they do 
(Williams 2014). However, industries that are not necessarily fossil fuel based but implicated 
as such, e.g., air transport and livestock production, might similarly at some point also engage 
in the construction of defensive responses, thus presenting an opportunity for future research. 
Nevertheless, it is evident from our study that the European supermajors reproduce their own 
inability and unwillingness to substantively address climate change. On the one hand, this is 
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especially worrying because of the catastrophic implications of climate change if unaddressed. 
On the other hand, it seems inevitable that in continuing constructing and enacting myths about 
their relationship with climate change, BP, Shell, and Total are, in effect, drilling their own 
graves. The deeper they drill, the more difficult it is to envision alternatives and capitalize on 
those opportunities 
Ethical approval: This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed 
by any of the authors.
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Table 1 – Audience coverage per data source  
Audience Speech count Text count 
Oil and gas 
industry  
Industry conferences and 
events (e.g., Oil and Money 
Conference; Voser 2010b) 
 
61 Specialist industry press 
(e.g., Hayward in The Oil 
Daily 2009) 
2 
Policy and 
government 
Think tanks and research 
centers (e.g., Brookings 
Institute; Browne 2005a) 
Government event (e.g., The 
Communist Party of China; 
Voser 2012c) 
25   
Business Business events and 
leadership fora (e.g., 
Hayward at Business 
Leaders’ Summit; in Fildes 
2007) 
24 Business press (e.g., 
Interview with Wall Street 
Journal; Hayward in 
Chazan 2009) 
Contributions in business 
press (e.g., article written 
for FT; Browne 2002c) 
24 
University Business school (e.g., 
London Business School; 
Hayward 2010a) 
University center or 
initiative (e.g., Oxford 
Energy Seminar, Oxford 
University; Dudley 2013c) 
15   
General 
stakeholder  
  CEO letter in sustainability 
report (e.g., van der Veer 
2008a) 
51 
Public   Media contributions and 
interviews in general press  
(e.g., Interview with 
Telegraph; de Margerie in 
Mason 2010) 
26 
Total  125  103 
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Table 2 – Overview of main findings 
Myth Defense Function Illustrative quotes 
Techno-fix Regression 
 
 
  
Disregard 
tensions 
 “I believe behavior and technology can do that for us, 
and we need to be in a position of demonstrating that 
there are answers to this tradeoff which make it possible 
for people to have a good lifestyle without damaging 
the environment.” (Browne in Minnesota Public Radio 
2002) 
“In 100 years, there should be more renewables. Is it 
good? If we can make progress. One of the concerns is 
a cost. Today we all know the most economical fuel is 
oil” (de Margerie in Mason 2010) 
Promethean oil 
man 
Fantasy Divert 
tensions 
“We are responding to the challenge of sustainable 
development and to the expectations and needs of 
people. Sustainable solutions support sustainable 
businesses, and I'm convinced that's good for the 
economic, environmental and social progress of our 
planet-and for us” (van der Veer 1999) 
“Behind these big numbers you find a story of human 
progress. Reliable and affordable sources of energy can 
help to improve many things, from living standards to 
life expectancy” (Dudley 2012a) 
Climate 
partnership 
Projecting Displace 
tensions 
“Governments specify their energy mix through 
royalties, taxation levels and permitting requirements. 
[…] Once the government decides, our responsibility is 
to be one of the lowest CO2 operators for this source of 
energy” (van der Veer 2006b) 
“By working in partnership with resource-rich countries 
we aim to create wealth for them too by providing the 
energy for the basic things of life, such as heat, light 
and mobility. I believe that is a noble cause.” (Hayward 
2007a) 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
1997 
  
  
Shell annual 
report (Shell 
1997) 
 
 New Statesman 
interview  
(Browne in Ghazi 
1997)  
NYT interview 
(Browne in 
Ibrahim 1997) 
Financial Times 
interview 
(Browne in 
Boulton 1997) 
Financial Times 
interview 
(Herkstroeter in 
Corzine 1997) 
 Stanford University 
(Browne 1997) 
Bundestag, Berlin 
(Browne in Coonan 1997) 
Greenpeace Business 
Conference (Browne in 
Lean 1997) 
  8 
1998 
Environmental 
and social 
review 
(Browne, 
1998a) 
 
The Shell 
report 
(Herkströter 
1998) 
 
 
 
 Washington Post 
interview 
(Browne in 
Hamilton 1998)  
 
Independent 
interview 
(Moody-Stuart in 
Harrison 1998) 
 Alaska Support Industry 
Alliance (Browne in Rosen 
1998) 
Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International 
Studies (Browne, 1998) 
World Energy Congress 
(Browne 1998c) 
Yale School of 
Management (Browne in 
Cowell 1998) 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (Moody-
Stuart in Patten 1998) 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
1999 
Environmental 
and social 
review (Browne 
1999) 
The Shell 
report 
(Moody-Stuart 
1999) 
   RTL Radio 
interview 
(Desmarest in 
Reuters News 
1999) 
Economic Club of Detroit 
(Browne in Evanoff 1999) 
National Environmental 
Research Council (Browne 
in Mitchell 1999) 
American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists 
Conference (Browne in 
Griffin 1999)  
Global Sustainable Energy 
Fair, Sustain 99 (van der 
Veer 1999) 
 7 
2000 
Environmental 
and social 
review (Browne 
2000a) 
The Shell 
report 
(Moody-Stuart 
2000) 
    Conference on Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
(Browne 2000b) 
National Petrochemical 
and Refiners Association 
(NPRA) Annual Meeting 
(Browne in Brideau 2000) 
World Petroleum Congress 
(Browne in Pike 2000) 
  5 
2001 
Environmental 
and social 
review (Browne 
2001) 
The Shell 
report (Watts 
2001) 
      
  
Shell's ‘Long Term Energy 
Scenarios’ (Watts in 
Mitchell 2001) 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2002 
Environmental 
and social 
review (Browne 
2002a) 
The Shell 
report (Watts 
2002) 
CSR report 
(Desmarest 
2002) 
NYT interview 
(Browne in Frey 
2002) 
Minnesota Public 
Radio interview 
(Minnesota Public 
Radio 2002) 
FT interview 
(Browne in 
Buchan and Buck 
2002) 
Media 
contribution FT 
(Browne 2002c) 
  Chatham House (Browne 
in Garten 2002) 
Stanford University 
(Browne 2002b) 
Chatham House speech, 
London (Philip Watts 
2002) 
 10 
2003 
Sustainability 
report (Browne 
2003a) 
The Shell 
report (van der 
Veer 2003a) 
CSR report 
(Desmarest 
2003) 
  Interview, NYT, 
(Watts in Becker 
2003) 
 Speech to Institutional 
Investors Group (Browne 
2003b)  
Shell Center for 
Sustainability at Houston's 
Rice University (van der 
Veer 2003b) 
World Gas Conference 
Tokyo (Watts 2003a) 
Council for Foreign 
Relations (Watts 2003b) 
 8 
2004 
Sustainability 
report (Browne 
2004b) 
The Shell 
report (van der 
Veer 2004a) 
CSR report 
(Desmarest 
2004) 
Financial Times 
interview 
(Browne in Boxell 
and Hoyos 2004)  
  Toronto’s Empire Club 
(Browne in Mahony 2004) 
Speech at the Taplin 
Environmental Lecture 
(Browne 2004a) 
Oil & Money conference 
(van der Veer 2004b) 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2005 
Sustainability 
report (Browne 
2005b) 
The Shell 
sustainability 
report (van der 
Veer 2005b) 
 
 
CSR report 
(Desmarest 
2005) 
Financial Times 
interview 
(Browne in 
Harvey 2005) 
CNBC interview 
(Browne in 
CNBC 2005) 
Daily Telegraph 
interview 
(Browne in 
Sylvester 2005) 
Financial Times 
interview (van 
der Veer in Catan 
2005) 
 Brookings Institute speech 
(Browne 2005a) 
European Union Energy 
Security Conference 
speech (Browne in Dow 
Jones 2005b) 
International Economics in 
Washington (Browne in 
Dow Jones 2005a) 
World Petroleum Congress 
Johannesburg (Browne in 
Hopson 2005) 
OTI I DEFAA 
Conference, Cafe Royal, 
London, UK (Browne 
2005c) 
International Oil Summit 
in Paris (van der Veer 
2005a) 
 13 
2006 
Sustainability 
report (Browne 
2006a) 
The Shell 
sustainability 
report (van der 
Veer 2006b) 
CSR report 
(de Margerie 
2006) 
Interview with 
Sunday Telegraph 
(Pfeifer 2006) 
NYT interview 
(van der Veer in 
Mouawad 2006) 
 
 
 International Petroleum 
Week (Browne in Fields 
2006) 
Columbia University 
(Browne in Burnham 
2006) 
Anchorage industry 
luncheon (Browne in 
Rosen 2006) 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) 
(Browne 2006b) 
Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates 
conference (van der Veer 
2006c) 
Arab Strategy Forum (van 
der Veer 2006a) 
23rd World Gas 
Conference, Amsterdam 
(van der Veer 2006d) 
 12 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2007 
Sustainability 
report 
(Hayward 
2007b)  
The Shell 
sustainability 
report (van der 
Veer 2007b) 
Environment 
and society 
report (de 
Margerie 
2007) 
Editorial (Browne 
in WSJ 2007) 
Interview with FT 
(Hayward in 
Crooks 2007) 
Interview in 
Guardian (van der 
Veer in 
Macalister 2007) 
WSJ commentary  
(de Margerie in 
Gold and Davis 
2007) 
Berlin Business Leaders’ 
Summit (Hayward in 
Fildes 2007) 
EAGE Annual Conference 
- London EXCEL Centre 
(Hayward 2007a) 
Café Crossfire Evening 
Debate (van der Veer 
2007a) 
International Petroleum 
Week Dinner (van der 
Veer 2007c) 
St Gallen conference, St 
Gallen, Switzerland (van 
der Veer 2007d) 
Symposium on Sustainable 
Solutions for Africa, Delft 
University of Technology 
(van der Veer 2007e) 
 13 
2008 
Sustainability 
review 
(Hayward 
2008a) 
The Shell 
sustainability 
report (van der 
Veer 2008a) 
Environment 
and society 
report (de 
Margerie 
2008a) 
Interview in 
Guardian 
(Hayward in 
Macalister 2008) 
NYT interview 
(van der Veer in 
Mouawad 2008) 
 Washington International 
Renewable Energy 
Conference (Hayward in 
The Oil Daily 2008) 
World Petroleum Congress 
(Hayward in Polczer 2008) 
Delivering Energy for 
Sustainable Growth - 
Tsinghua University, 
Beijing (Hayward 2008b) 
HRH Prince Of Wales’s 
3rd Annual Accounting 
For Sustainability Forum, 
London (Hayward 2008c) 
EastWest Institute, ‘Shell 
scenarios for the 21st 
century’ (van der Veer 
2008b) 
International Energy 
Forum in Rome (van der 
Veer 2008c) 
IUCN World Conservation 
Congress (van der Veer 
2008d) 
World Petroleum 
Congress (Dow 
Jones 
International 
News 2008) 
Conference on 
World Security, 
Geneva (de 
Margerie 2008b) 
14 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2009 
Sustainability 
review 
(Hayward 
2009a) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report  (Voser 
2009a) 
Environment 
and society 
report (de 
Margerie 
2009) 
Commentary in 
FT (Hayward in 
Crooks 2009) 
Interview with 
Wall Street 
Journal (Hayward 
in Chazan 2009) 
Interview with 
IOD 
(International Oil 
Daily 2009) 
Press conference 
(van der Veer in 
Schneyer 2009) 
Commentary in 
Globe and Mail 
(Voser 2009c) 
Interview in 
Guardian (Voser 
in Webb 2009) 
Interview in FT 
(de Margerie in 
Hoyos 2009) 
Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates 
(Hayward in The Oil Daily 
2009) 
Latin American Energy 
Conference (Hayward in 
Campbell and Woodall 
2009) 
World Gas Conference 
(Hayward in Reuters News 
2009) 
Oil & Money conference 
(Hayward 2009c) 
World Oil and Gas 
Assembly, Bangalore 
(Hayward 2009b) 
10th International Oil 
Summit, held in Paris (van 
der Veer 2009a) 
14th Asia Oil and Gas 
Conference in Kuala 
Lumpur (van der Veer 
2009b) 
Woodrow Wilson Center, 
Washington DC (Voser 
2009b) 
Global Economic 
Roundtable at Spruce 
Meadows (Voser in Ross 
2009) 
Offshore Europe 
Conference, 
Aberdeen, 
Scotland 
(Henshall and 
Adams 2009) 
World Gas 
Conference (de 
Margerie in Dow 
Jones Energy 
Service 2009) 
21 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2010 
Sustainability 
review 
(Hayward 
2010b) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report  (Voser 
2010c) 
Environment 
and society 
report (de 
Margerie 
2010a) 
Interview in 
Guardian 
(Hayward in 
Macalister 2010) 
Interview in FT, 
(Hayward in 
Crooks 2010) 
Wall Street 
Journal Interview 
(Murray and 
Strassel 2010) 
Commentary in 
Reuters (de 
Margerie Reuters 
2010) 
Interview with 
Telegraph (de 
Margerie in 
Mason 2010)  
London Business School 
(Hayward 2010a) 
Peterson Institute, 
(Hayward 2010c) 
House of Commons, 
London (Hayward 2010d) 
Academy of National 
Economy, Moscow 
(Hayward 2010e) 
The Wall Street Journal's 
ECO:nomics conference in 
Santa Barbara (Voser 
2010d) 
St. Gallen Conference 
(Voser 2010e) 
21st World Energy 
Congress in Montreal 
(Voser 2010f) 
Oil and Money 
Conference in London 
(Voser 2010b) 
Fortune Global Forum, 
Cape Town (Voser in 
Wearden 2010) 
London Business School 
Global Leadership Summit 
(Voser 2010a) 
The Central Party School 
of the Communist Party of 
China Beijing (Voser 
2010g) 
Delft University of 
Technology (Voser 2010h) 
Sijthoff lecture, 
Amsterdam (Voser 2010i) 
United Nations 
Special 
Representative of 
the Secretary 
General on 
Business and 
Human Rights, 
Paris, France (de 
Margerie 2010b) 
International Oil 
Summit in Paris 
(International Oil 
Daily 2010) 
23 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2011 
Sustainability 
review (Dudley 
2011a) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report  (Voser 
2011e) 
Environment 
and society 
report (de 
Margerie 
2011) 
Commentary in 
Guardian 
(Hayward in 
Finch et al. 2011) 
 WSJ commentary 
(de Margerie in 
Herron 2011) 
WSJ interview 
(de Margerie in 
Amiel 2011) 
Tsinghua University, 
Tsinghua, China (Dudley 
2011b) 
Energy Outlook 2030, St 
James Square, London 
(Dudley 2011c) 
CERA Week Conference, 
Houston, USA (Dudley 
2011d) 
World National Oil 
Companies Congress 
(Dudley 2011e) 
The World Petroleum 
Congress, Doha, Qatar 
(Dudley 2011f) 
The 2011 Hinton lecture, 
Royal Institution of Great 
Britain (Dudley 2011g) 
Barclays capital 
conference keynote 
presentation (Dudley 
2011h) 
Cambridge Sustainability 
Leadership Programme 
Alumni Reunion, London, 
UK (Voser 2011d) 
Shell Annual Reception, 
London, UK (Voser 
2011a) 
Singapore Energy Summit 
(Voser 2011f) 
Harvard Business School 
Club of the Netherlands 
and the Ivy Circle, The 
Hague, Netherlands 
(Voser 2011g) 
Alumni of Harvard, IMD, 
INSEAD, Rochester 
Business Schools, Zurich, 
Switzerland, (Voser 
2011h) 
2011 Channing Corporate 
Citizenship Award (Voser 
2011c) 
CERA 
Conference, 
Houston, USA (de 
Margerie in The 
Oil Daily 2011) 
CERA 
Conference, 
Houston, USA (de 
Margerie in The 
Oil Daily 2011) 
Chamber of 
Commerce, 
Calgary, Canada 
(de Margerie in 
Polczer 2011) 
Asia Oil and Gas 
Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, 
Indonesia (de 
Margerie in 
International Oil 
Daily 2011) 
 
23 
2012 
Sustainability 
review (Dudley 
2012a) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report (Voser 
2012d) 
CSR report 
(de Margerie 
2012) 
Interview with 
CNN (Dudley in 
Quest 2012) 
Commentary 
(Voser in Reuters 
News 2012) 
 BP Energy Outlook 2030, 
London (Dudley 2012b) 
Greater Cleveland 
Partnership speech, 
Cleveland, US (Dudley 
2012c) 
Abu Dhabi Speech - “New 
times, new thinking” 
(Dudley 2012d) 
International Petroleum 
Week, London, UK 
(Dudley 2012e) 
Economic Club of Chicago 
(Dudley 2012f) 
Central Party School, The 
Communist Party of 
China, Beijing (Voser 
2012c) 
6th World Water Forum, 
Marseille, France (Voser 
2012b) 
25th World Gas 
Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia (Voser 
2012e) 
31st Annual CERA Week 
Executive Conference 
(Voser 2012a) 
World Gas 
Conference (de 
Margerie in Platts 
European Gas 
Daily 2012) 
 
15 
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Corporate reports Media articles and interviews Speeches N* 
 
BP Shell Total BP Shell Total BP Shell Total  
2013 
Sustainability 
review (Dudley 
2013d) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report  (van 
Beurden 2013) 
CSR report 
(de Margerie 
2013) 
Interview in Wall 
Street Journal 
(Dudly in Jenkins 
2013) 
Wall Street 
Journal interview 
(Gold 2013) 
Interview, RTL 
Radio (de 
Margerie in 
Reuters News 
2013) 
WACA Conference, 
Washington DC, (Dudley 
2013e) 
Oxford Energy Seminar, 
Oxford University, UK 
(Dudley 2013c) 
Canada Europe Energy 
Summit, London (Dudley 
2013a) 
Pandit Deendayal 
Petroleum University, 
Gujarat, India (Dudley 
2013b) 
Central Party School, 
Beijing (Voser 2013a) 
International Petroleum 
Technology Conference, 
Beijing (Voser 2013b) 
Chief Executives Club of 
Boston (Voser 2013c) 
Oil and Money 
Conference, London, UK 
(Voser 2013d) 
World Energy Congress 
2013 Daegu, South Korea 
(Voser 2013e) 
 15 
2014 
Sustainability 
review (Dudley 
2014a) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report (van 
Beurden 
2014a) 
Sustainable 
growth 
report 
(Pouyanné 
2014a) 
 Financial Times, 
interview (van 
Beurden in 
Chazan 2014) 
Interview in 
Reuters (van 
Beurden in Kemp 
2014) 
 International Petroleum 
Exhibition & Conference, 
Abu Dhabi (Dudley 
2014b) 
Oil & Money conference, 
London, UK (Dudley 
2014c) 
World Petroleum Congress 
(Dudley 2014d) 
Global Energy Policy at 
Columbia University (van 
Beurden 2014b) 
Centennial celebration, 
Shell Technology Centre 
(van Beurden 2014c) 
Keynote speech at 
Kuwait Oil and 
Gas Show. 
Kuwait: OPEC 
(Pouyanné 2014b) 
11 
2015 
Sustainability 
review (Dudley 
2015a) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell plc 
Sustainability 
Report (van 
Beurden 
2015a) 
Integrating 
climate into 
our strategy 
(Pouyanné 
2015) 
Interview, CNBC 
(Dudely in 
Cosgrave 2015) 
Statement in FT 
(van Beurden in 
Crooks, 2015) 
Interview in 
Guardian (van 
Beurden in 
Macalister and 
Carrington 2015) 
 World Gas Conference, 
Paris (Dudley 2014e) 
Mexican Energy Reform 
Summit (Dudley 2015b) 
Quest Carbon Capture and 
Storage speech (van 
Beurden 2015b) 
OPEC International 
Seminar (van Beurden 
2015c) 
World Gas 
Conference, Paris 
(Pouyanné in Kent 
and Landauro 
2015) 
 
11 
N* 18 19 14 25 17 8 63 51 13 228 
 * N=number of texts 
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ENDNOTES 
i The term ‘supermajors’ was coined by Doug Terreson, Managing Director and Head of 
Energy Research at Morgan Stanley to refer to the newly formed BP-Amoco prior to the two 
companies merging in 1998. The term, which first appeared in an issue of Business Week 
(1997) became increasing popular after further mergers, notably between Exxon and Mobil in 
1999. There are six supermajors—BP plc, Chevron Corporation, ExxonMobil Corporation, 
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Total SA and Eni SpA. These are considered the six largest non-state 
owned oil and gas companies by total revenue (Gensler, 2017).  
 
ii Figure 1 provides a basic descriptive illustration of each myth’s coverage based on different 
types of organizational audiences. We calculated coverage by using NVivo’s word frequency 
analysis feature. This involves searching for a collection of terms within a selection of texts – 
‘coverage’ (expressed as %) refers to the amount of times a term is identified relative to the 
total words within the text(s) analysed. Five terms were used for each myth; these stemmed 
from the keywords identified during our coding process (Techno-fix myth = technology, 
efficiency, innovation, science, engineering; Promethean oil man myth = economic growth, 
human progress, poverty, prosperity, living standards; Partnership myth = partnership, NGO, 
United Nations, government, environmental group). In cases where words within a given text 
were not those of a CEO (e.g., in newspaper articles during an interview), these were omitted 
to ensure only CEO-speak was counted. 
 
 
                                                
